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In The Supreme Court 
Of The State Of Utah 
GEORGE SALTAS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, J 
vs. ' 
DAVID A. AFFLECK, doing business 
under the name and style of D. A. 
AFFLECK GROCERY, 
Defendant, ~ 
KENNETH BUITE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case 
No. 6190 
We will discuss the questions in the order of respond-
ent's brief. 
Apparently counsel for respondent fails to appre-
ciate the nature of and the amount of damages that are 
recoverable under our Utah death statute, particularly 
by a father for the death of an adult son. At least the 
authorities cited by counsel so reflect, inasmuch as 
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2 
he has not cited one case in point sustaining his con-
tention that the verdict rendered by the jury on the 
first trial was inadequate. 
RESPONDENT'S CASES 
First, we call attention to the fact that how large a 
verdict the jury might have rendered under the evidence 
is wholly beside the point. There is a large range be-
tween inadequate damages and excessive damages, par-
ticularly in a death case where actual pecuniary loss 
is uncertain. The question is not how large a verdict 
the jury might have rendered, but was the verdict so 
inadequate that it could be said the trial court was 
justified in setting it aside under Section 104-40-7, Re-
vised Statutes of Utah 1933, now relied upon by respond-
ent. Clearly the following cases have no application in 
that they simply consider what damages were not ex-
cessive. 
Berry v. Dewey, (Kan.) 172 Pac. 27; 
El Paso Railroad Co. v. Buttery, 216 S. W. 817, 
(apparently respondent's citation of this case 
is incorrect.) 
Bright v. Thatcher, (Mo.) 215 S. W. 788; 
McMahon v. Flynn, (Minn.) 191 N. W. 902; 
Louisville Ry. Co. v. Smith (Ky.) 263 S. W. 29. 
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Klinge v. So. Pac. Co., 89 Utah 284, 57 Pac. (2d) 
367, had to do with permanent injuries for loss of an 
arm, causing loss of earning power for life and was 
not an action for death. 
Skidmore v. Seattle (Wash.) 244 Pac. 545, had to do 
· with a right of a father to recover for the value of the 
services of a minor child from the time of injury until 
majority. Deceased was fifteen at the time of his death. 
It is significant that nothing was awarded either in the 
trial court or the appellate court for pecuniary loss to 
the father after deceased would have reached his ma-
jority. 
Pierre v. Powell Box Company, 77 So. 943, and 
JVirth v. Alex-Dussell Iron TVorks, 74 So. 551, both come 
from the State of Louisiana. Why the damages in these 
cases were inadequate is obvious. At page seventeen of 
our original brief, we purposely pointed out that the 
Louisiana death statute is fundamentally different from 
our Utah statute, in that in Louisiana not only actual 
damages to the heirs, including anguish and suffering 
caused such heirs, are allowed, but also such damages as 
the deceased might have recovered had he survived. See 
Reed v. vVarren (La.} 132 So. 250. In the Pierre case 
'"-hich was for the death of a sixteen year old son, the 
court had this to say: 
"In view of the fact that plaintiffs are suing 
in the right of deceased. who suffered much dur-
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ing the say seventeen months which intervened 
between the accident and his death, and also in 
their own right for the loss by death of the pros-
pective support, companionship and felial af-
fection, upon which they were entitled to rely, we 
are further of the opinion that the damages 
awarded by the district court should be increased. 
* * * His right arm was caught between the wheels 
and crushed as a stalk of sugar-cane is crushed 
between the rollers of a mill, and he sustained 
serious injury to his side." 
Contrast our Utah statute, where only actual pecun-
iary damages sustained by the heirs on account of the 
death are recoverable and nothing for suffering of de-
ceased or his injury, or anguish and suffering of the 
heirs. Wirth v. Alex-Dussell Iron Works, supra, the other 
Louisiana case cited by respondent, was for the death of 
a husband and father leaving a widow and three minor 
children, he being their sole support. 
Gibson v. Wineman, 106 So. 826, a Mississippi case 
is distinguishable on the same grounds as the Louisiana 
cases. The Mississippi statute unlike Utah was dual in 
character, allowing damages deceased could have recov-
ered for the injury, and also damages caused the heirs 
by the death. The following quotation from the case re-
veals the character of the Mississippi statute: 
"He suffered intense pain. There was no 
element of contributory negligence * * * and 
appellant was entitled to recover damages of 
every kind to the decedent and also all damages 
of every kind to her as the widow." 
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5' 
Specifically, what item of damage or damages the 
jury neglected to consider is nowhere disclosed by plain-
tiff, and as we have specifically pointed out, each of 
the cases cited by plaintiff is readily distinguishable from 
the instant case. We are not concerned with a case where-
in recovery can be had for services of a minor child, 
for services of a deceased wife, nor for loss of support 
of a father or husband having a legal obligation to sup-
port his wife and children. This case has nothing what-
soever to do with damages recoverable in a personal in-
jury action, with loss of earnings, injury, pain, and 
suffering and the like. Our statute is not a survival 
statute like those of Louisiana and Mississippi, (Mason 
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, "l Utah "l"l), but 
only pecuniary damages resulting to the heirs (in this 
case the father of deceased) can be recovered. Nothing 
can be allowed for sentimental loss or grief and sorrow. 
How large a verdict the jury might have rendered is 
wholly beside the point. The value of a human life has 
nothing to do with the measure of damages in an action 
for wrongful death under our Utah Statute as counsel 
would have believe in his closing argument, where he 
attempts to inject the idea that, "Nothing is more precious 
than life." 
We consider it unnecessary here to again specifical-
ly enumerate all of the reasons fully set out in our orig-
inal brief why in view of all the evidence, including 
cross examination, the actual loss to plaintiff was not 
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necessarily substantial, and that the jury as fair mind-
ed men were fully justified in returning a verdict of 
$800.00. We feel it unnecessary to call specific attention 
to each of the numerous cases cited in our original 
brief where damages ranging from nominal damages 
to a few hundred dollars have been held adequate, 
particularly in cases of the death of an adult, unmar-
ried man, and that it was erro'r to set aside such verdicts, 
the measure of recovery being peculiarly a question 
for the jury. 
Under Section 104-40-'!, relied on by respondent, 
the court cannot set aside a verdict for inadequacy of 
the damages where the evidence justifies the verdict 
rendered. In Hirabelli v. Daniels, it was error to set 
aside a verdict in an action for personal injuries for 
$1.00 for pain and suffering and for $22.00 reasonable 
medical treatment, although $50.00 had actually been 
paid for such treatment. The court there says: 
"To justify the court in interfering, it should 
be made to appear that the jury plainly disre-
garded or misconceived the instructions or the 
evidence or acted under the influence of passion 
or prejudice." 
In .Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande Company, 138 
Pac. 1185, 44 Utah 100, at pages 121 and 122, referring to 
what was then our present Section 104-40-7, the court 
said: 
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"Neither is either party on that question en-
titled to the judgment of the court below in a 
case of tort tried to a jury. Both parties, as to 
that, are entitled to the unprejudiced judgment 
of the jury. That is exclusively within their pro-
vince. Their power and discretion, when prop-
erly exercised and when they have been properly 
directed as to the measure of damages and the 
mode of assessing it, may not be interfered with 
merely because the court above or below may 
think. the amount rendered is too large, or even 
may think it appears to he larger than the evi-
dence apparently or fairly justifies. A court, 
vacating a verdict and granting a new trial by 
merely setting up his opinion or judgment against 
that of the jury, hut usurps judicial power and 
prostitutes the constitutional trial hy jury. * * * 
It should clearly he made to appear that the jury 
totally mistook or disregarded the rules of law 
hy which the damages were to be regulated, or 
wholly misconceived or disregarded all the evi-
dence, and hy so doing committed gross and palp-
able error hy rendering a verdict so enormous 
or outrageous or unjust as to be attributable to 
neither the charge nor the evidence, but only to 
passion or prejudice." 
And counsel in referring to 46 C. J., page 20?_,~ 
page 11 of respondent's brief, fails to quote from page 
211 as follows: 
"In some jurisdictions, especially under stat-
utes, the inadequacy must be so great as to in-
dicate passion, prejudice, or other improper mo-
tive on the part of the jury." 
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And Utah, among other states specifically enumerated, 
is listed. 
Appellant attempts to make a point of the fact 
that the jury deliberated for only an hour. We see no rea-
son why this would not be sufficient to jurors of ordin-
ary intelligence, particularly when they had already 
heard the evidence (on damage only one witness) and 
had full opportunity to hear the arguments of counsel. 
The jury was properly instructed on the measure of 
damages and it is presumed they followed the instruc-
tions of the court. Paxton v. Spencer, 265 Pac. ?51, 71 
Utah 313 at page 326; Coke v. Timbey, 192 Pac., 624, 57 
Utah 53, at page 60; Dee v. San Pedro L. A. and S. L. 
R. Co., 16?' Pac. 246, 50 Utah 16?' at page 188; Harris v. 
Ogden Steam Laundry Company, 11 ?' Pac. ?'00, 39 Utah 
436. It is assumed that the jurors selected were men of 
ordinary intelligence, with minds of their own, and 
conscientious in respect to their duties. State v. DeTVeese, 
1 ?'2 Pac. 290, 51 Utah 515 at page 524. And until the con-
trary clearly appears, it must be presumed that the jury, 
being fair-minded men, in rendering the verdict ex-
pressed their honest judgment. Carpenter v. Dicky, 26 
N. Dak. 1 ?6, 143 N. W. 964. 
All of the jurors in the instant case were agreed 
the damages would be between $500.00 and $1,000.00. 
None were in favor of a larger verdict. (Pff. Tr. 103-106). 
It is not likely that all the jurors disregarded the evi-
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9 
dence or instructions, and there was no showing to the 
effect in support of the motion. The burden was on the 
plaintiff in this case to prove actual pecuniary loss 
to plaintiff, and little, if any, was shown. No special 
damages were asked for. There was no showing of pas-
sion or prejudice, nor a plain disregard by the jury of 
the instructions of the court, or the evidence in the cas~ 
as required by the Statute. The verdict of $800.00 was 
fairly and justly rendered and was certainly justified 
by the evidence. We respectfully submit that the trial 
court erred in setting aside the verdict of the jury on 
the first trial. 
INJECTION OF INSURANCE INTO THE CASE 
Although Egan v. O'Malley, (Wyo.) 21 Pac. (2d) 
821, Pc:tge 16 respondent's brief, goes about as far as any 
of the cases in permitting examination of the jurors on 
voir dire, and even in that case, there was no mention 
of any specific insurance company, and there was no 
further reference or suggestion of insurance after the 
voir dire examination and during the trial of the case. 
The court says on page 823: 
"There appears to have been no further 
reference made to the matter after the necessary 
questions were put and answered or after the 
conclusion of the voir dire examination of the 
jurors." 
The Egan case was one of first impression in Wyoming, 
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10 
and like in Balle v. Smith, a suggestive procedure was 
outlined in questioning jurors as a caution to attorneys 
in future cases. This and the Balle v. Smith case should 
not constitute a license for attorneys to over-emphasize 
the matter of insurance before the jury by the asking 
of unnecessary questions, even on voir dire examina-
tion, and as stated in Parker v. Bushouse (Mich.) 236 
N. W. 222, cited in both Balle v. Smith and the Egan 
case, further reference to insurance during the trial of 
the case should be excluded "under penalty of a revers-
al of the case." 
MISCONDUCT DURING THE TRIAL 
"Right after the accident you made out an affi-
davit to-you gave a statement to a man by the name 
of Parkinson, who is an adjustor for an insurance com-
pany?" There is no mistaking here that counsel himself 
injected not only the word "adjuster" but directly con-
nected the name of Parkinson, who counsel well knew 
was actually associated with Mr. Stewart in the defense 
of defendant Affleck. Nor can it be questioned that direct 
reference was made to the "insurance company." 
By what stretch of the imagination counsel excuses 
this misconduct by reason of Reid v. Owens, (Utah) 
93 Pac. (2d) 680, we are unable to understand. In that 
case the liability of the defendant father for the negligent 
acts of his son was only provable by the admission of 
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the father that on account of the carelessness · of the 
son, he had taken out insurance to protect him. The 
admission was a necessary part of plaintiff's case. There 
is no such necessity when a witness is examined on cross 
examination in connection with a written statement, 
when the contents of the statement are what the court 
and jury are concerned with and not the fact that the 
statement was given to an adjuster for an insurance 
company. 
We do not question the right of counsel on either 
side to examine a witness in connection with a state-
ment. That does not necessitate or justify any reference 
to an insurance company or an adjuster or anything of 
that kind. 
Just what use counsel intended to make of the 
statement to Parkinson, if any, is very vague. He claims 
it was a statement made right after the accident, but 
Mr. Stewart offered counsel such statement made to 
Mr. Parkinson on the 28th day of January, 1938, the 
day following the accident, the only statement made, 
but counsel declined to use it. Was the question asked 
in good faith? Counsel claims i¥' was important to show 
that the witness had previously told Parkinson that 
she had not seen the car until it loomed right in front of 
the car in which she was riding, yet counsel never of~ 
fered at any time to prove that the witness made any 
such statement to Parkinson. 
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But even if we should grant, which we do not, 
that there was some legitimate purpose in referring to 
the statement made to Parkinson, the authorities all 
hold that it is unnecessary and improper to refer to an in-
surance company or an adjuster. We will not undertake 
here to again comment on the numerous cases which 
condemn the attempt on counsel's part to bring out the 
fact that a certain statement was given to an agent 
for an insurance company, notwithstanding the state-
ment itself might be used for some legitimate purpose 
at the trial. On this point we invite careful considera-
tion to the cases cited on pages 41 to 53 of our original 
brief. The courts all condemn such reference to insur· 
ance, whether by counsel himself, or through a witness 
by the obvious efforts of counsel, and notwithstanding 
that such statement might otherwise serve a legitimate 
purpose. 
ARGUMENT TO THE JURY 
Neither is there any misunderstanding that coun-
sel was guilty of deliberate misconduct in his closing 
argument to the jury, when he left no doubt in the jurors' 
minds that an insurance company was defending the 
action. Even eliminating ·the word "ADJUSTER" to which 
counsel objects, (reference is made to exact words in 
abstract) his argument was equally effective. He had 
already himself deliberately brought out in the evi-
dence the fact that Norma Chamberlain had right after 
the accident made out a statement to Parkinson, an 
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adjuster for an insurance company, and in view of this 
and his past examination of each juror on voir dire, 
his argument that "on the day of the accident or soon 
thereafter, an INVESTIGATOR was out at the scene of 
the accident" could only be suggestive of one thing, 
and that was the ADJUSTER to whom Norma Chamberlain 
right after the accident had given a statement. Whether 
the word INVESTIGATOR or ADJUSTER was used is in· 
significant. To the lay mind they are synonymous, and 
the jury was well educated during the trial. It is the 
course of improper conduct of counsel throughout the 
trial of which appellant complains. Counsel's argument 
that "defendant secured an attorney who spends all 
his time in the defense of this class of cases" is not 
disputed in any particular. The court had already denied 
defendant's vigorous objections to the obvious pur-
pose of counsel in examining each and every juror to 
an unnecessary extent on insurance, and specifically 
the Northwest Casualty Company, and had already 
without even reprimanding counsel overruled (Tr. 192', 
Ab. 92') defendant's objection to counsel's questioning 
Norma Chamberlain about the insurance adjuster. The 
harmful effect of arguing matters in the presence of 
the jury is well known to counsel. How then, can he 
claim that appellant's objection to his argument to the 
jury was not timely, simply because appellant's coun-
sel saw fit to not discuss and emphasize insurance be-
fore the jury, but rather make proper and timely ob-
jection immediately after the jury had withdrawn, but 
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before the instructions and exhibits were delivered to 
them. See Tr. 321. Objections of counsel and comments 
of the court and discussions before the jury would un-
doubtedly do further damage. As pointed out in George-
son v. Nielson, (Wis.) 260 N. W. 461, that is often ex-
actly what counsel for plaintiff is seeking. In that case 
it is said: 
"Objection to the remark of opposing coun-
sel enhances likelihood that the intended effect 
will he produced both by attracting attention to 
it, and by invoking a repudiation. Remark being 
made, or made and repudiated, the intended effect 
is probably produced. * * * Even a reprimand 
to offending counsel does not cure the wrong done 
to litigants by prejudicial remarks." 
Counsel seems to object to the fact that appellant 
preserved a record of this case and claims the procedure 
of appellant as unorthodox in introducing the insurance 
policy in evidence for the benefit of the court to show 
that the coverage under the policy did not extend to 
Kenneth Butte as an individual using the truck for his 
own purposes. Certainly Kenneth Butte was entitled 
to a fair trial without the wrongful injection of insur· 
ance into the case. Certainly counsel for Kenneth Butte 
had not only the right, but the duty to see that Kenneth 
Butte got a fair trial. The common attempt in personal 
injury actions to wrongfully get before the jury the 
matter of insurance is well-known among practicing 
attorneys and trial judges, as evidenced by the express 
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15 
statements of plaintiff's counsel in this case, and coun-
sel for defendant in such cases is called to guard against 
such prejudicial matter. We see no point to counsel's 
objection that appellant preserved a record for review. 
As this court stated in Reid v. Owem, supra, "we 
would he closing our eyes to a fact well-known to trial 
courts and trial lawyers were we to assert that the prob-
ability of any jury being influenced in determining the 
question of liability and the question of the amount 
of recovery by the fact that an insurance company 
would pay the damages assessed is so remote as not 
to challenge judicial notice." In our original brief, we 
have set forth any number of cases which definitely 
hold that the injection of insurance into a case is so 
highly prejudicial that it cannot he said defendant has 
received a fair trial either on the issues of liability or 
on the issues of damage, and an instruction of the court 
cannot remove the probability· of prejudice and there 
ls :reversible error. In this case, insurance was injected 
into the case during every important step of the trial, 
on voir dire examination of each juror, during the trial 
of the case on examination of witnesses, in argument 
to the jury, and was even discussed in the jury room. 
(Ab. 31). Counsel disregarded all precautions outlined 
in Balle v. Smith. No opportunity was lost to prejudicial-
ly inform each and every juryman on voir dire examin-
ation. Misconduct during the trial in the examination of 
witnesses or in argument to the jury after voir dire 
examination proves counsel's lack of good faith and 
requires a reversal. 
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ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS 
Respondent states generally that "all" erroneous 
instructions were cured when such instructions were 
read as a whole. Such a sweeping statement evades the 
issues and points of law presented for review in our 
original brief. It is significant that counsel wholly fails 
to discuss the most serious errors contained in the in-
structions. 
Instruction No. 11 
To simply state that this erroneous instruction was 
cured by another instruction stating the general rule 
that "one has a right to assume that others using the 
highway will use reasonable care until put on notice 
to the contrary," but sidesteps the most hurtful effect 
of said instruction. The important point is that the in-
struction erroneously tells the jury that it was the duty 
of Kenneth Butte TO A VOID COLLIDING WITH ANY 
PERSON OR OTHER CAR. The erroneous and mis-
leading effect of such statement defining the duty of 
defendant, can be appreciated by the fact that aver-
age jurors are not familiar with abstract rules of law. 
Their minds are not like trial judges and attorneys. 
To tell the jury that it is the duty of the defendant 
TO A VOID COLLIDING WITH ANY PERSON OR OTHER 
CAR ON THE HIGHWAY is but to tell the jury the de-
fendant was at fault if his car collided with the one 
in which deceased was riding. In Knutson v. Lurie, 
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(Iowa) 251 N. W. 14?', and Fry v. Smith, (Iowa) 253 
N. W. 147, it was held that even a portion of the same 
fustruction could not cure another part of such in· 
'strU.ction wherein the duty of defendant was erron-
eously defined, the jury in such instance being likely 
to feel bound by the absolute duty. We submit this in-
struction is erroneous, confusing, self-contradictory, and 
calculated to mislead the jury. 
Instruction No. 12 
The authorities respondent has cited in an effort 
to sustain instruction No. 12 have no application to 
the instant case in that the city ordinance relied on in 
the instant case is void on its face, and specific objection 
(Dft. Ab. 125) was made to the giving of said instruc-
tion. It is not necessary to specifically plead the inval-
idity of an ordinance in such case. 4J C. ]., page 5?'9, 
cited by respondent reads as follows: 
"Since an ordinance u:hich is not void on its 
face is presumed to he valid, one who relies on 
its invalidity must plead this fact and allege facts 
showing it to be invalid." 
In Roper v. Greenspon, (Mo.) 198 S. W. 1107, the 
ordinance was in fact valid, and it was, therefore, error 
to refuse to admit it in evidence. On page 1110 of the 
opinion, the actual holding of the court is stated: 
"We hold the ordinance in question a valid 
one and that for this reason, there was error in 
refusing to admit it in evidence." 
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In Neary v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 
(Mont.) 110 Pac. 226, page 28 respondent's brief, the or-
dinance was not void on its face, and the same is true 
of American Railway Express Company vs. Lancaster, 
(Ky.) 251 S. W. 670, page 31, respondent's brief, which 
case did not even have to do with the invalidity of the 
ordinance, and note the quotation from American Fork 
City v. Charlier, 43 Utah 231, 134 Pac. 739, page 29 
respondent's brief, where an exception is noted "where it 
appears on the face of the ordinance that the city exceed-
ed the power." 
In view of the fact that the ordinance in the in-
stant case is clearly void on its face, and specific ob-
jection was made to the giving of said instruction in 
the trial court, it was error to submit such instruction 
to the jury. 
Instruction No. 14 
Counsel attempts to avoid the point that although 
this instruction placed upon the jury the absolute duty 
of finding for plaintiff, if the conditions expressly stated 
in the instruction were found in plaintiff's favor, it en-
tirely omitted the issue of plaintiff's contributory neg-
Ligence. The fact that this issue and other considerations 
were omitted from said instruction No. 14 hut included 
in other instructions cannot cure the erroneous instruc-
tion, because a clear conflict is created. We direct at-
tention to the cases cited on pag·e 68 of our original brief. 
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Instruction No. t 7 
Respondent evades the errors in this instruction. 
Like No. 14, instruction t 7 purports to lay down a formu-
la under which the jury's verdict must be for the plain-
tiff, but wholly fails to take into consideration the issue 
of plaintiff"s contributory negligence and is otherwise 
misleading. 
Respondent discusses none of the remaining er-
roneous instructions. 
An instruction calculated to probably do harm is 
prejudicial and reversible error. In jensen v. Utah Ry. 
Company, 270 Pac. 349, 72 Utah 366, at page 400, the 
rule is stated thusly: 
··Where the committed error is of such nature 
or character as calculated to do harm, or on its 
face as having the natural tendency to do so, 
prejudice will be presumed, until by the record 
it is affirmatively shown that the error was not 
or could not have been of harmful effect." 
INSTRUCTIONS DENIED 
Respondent nowhere specifically points out where 
any of the instructions requested by defendant and re-
fused by the court were fully and satisfactorily covered 
in other instructions given. The requested instructions 
refused by the court each presented a material issue 
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on defendant's theory of the evidence and the case, 
and a refusal to instruct on any one of such theories 
affects defendant's substantial rights and is reversible 
error. 
Other substantial errors were assigned but not dis-
cussed by respondent. Some have a special significance 
in view of counsel's misconduct relating to insurance. 
Matters, such as reading in his argument to the jury 
from a deposition not in evidence (Assignment of Error 
No. 6), eliciting from his own witness, Gerald Franz, 
the fact that "his claim was taken care of," (Assignment 
of Error 28) making improper references to a criminal 
proceeding against the defendant, Kenneth Butte, (As-
signment of Error 31) all prevented defendant from hav-
ing a fair trial, and these and other assignments of 
error fully discussed in our original brief and not men-
tioned by respondent all merit consideration on this 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
As we view respondent's brief, he has in some in-
stances merely attempted to avoid or cloud the issues, 
and in other instances ignored the unavoidable con-
clusion that prejudicial error was committed. 
Appellant does not contend that a new trial cannot 
be granted where there has been a "plain disregard by 
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the jury of the instructions of the court," or .. the evi-
dence in the case as to satisfy the court that the ver-
dict was rendered under a misapprehension of such in-
structions or under the influence of passion or prejudice." 
Our position as supported by the authorities is that it 
must clearly appear that there has been such a disregard 
by the jury; that a disregard is not evidenced where 
the questions of liability and damages are such as to 
justify reasonable men in reaching the conclusion which 
the jury reached. We have clearly pointed out in our 
original brief that the verdict on the first trial was justi-
fied by the facts and the law, and there was, therefore, 
no proper discretion to be exercised by the court. We 
also pointed out that the authorities hold that the dis-
regard by the jury of the instructions and the evidence 
must be such as to make clear that the verdict "was 
rendered under a misapprehension of such instructions 
or under the influence of passion or prejudice." 
We know of no case where there has been such a 
plain disregard of fair court procedure as is evidenced 
by this record. Prior to the impaneling of the jury, re-
spondent stated his intention to interrogate the jury con-
cerning insurance. He carried out this expressed inten-
tion to the letter. He claims the question asked Norma 
Chamberlain was a proper question on cross examin-
ation, but made no use of the statement referred to and 
in no manner attempted to impeach the witness although 
the very statement referred to by counsel was handed 
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to him in open court. This was followed by his argu-
ment to the jury and his statement wholly outside of the 
record that "an investigator was out at the scene of the 
accident." We regret the inclusion of the word "ad-
juster" at page 53 of our brief. While the record was 
identified by us, our statement should not have been in 
quotation marks. It is common knowledge, as recognized 
by the courts, that the words "investigator" and "ad-
juster" are used interchangeably and in either event, the 
jury could not have been mistaken that counsel meant 
"insurance investigator." Assignments of error relating 
to the question of insurance, with the record supporting 
them, preclude any conclusion other than that respond-
ent intended that the jury should clearly understand 
that an insurance company was involved. We do not be-
lieve this court will place its stamp of approval on the 
trial of cases based on prejudicial misconduct such as 
was permitted by the trial court. 
A court should not improperly instruct a jury 
contrary to statutory law, particularly when such in-
struction is based upon an ordinance invalid upon its 
face. While it is contended that appellant is estopped 
from asserting this invalidity, the fact remains that this 
court declared such ordinance invalid after the issues 
had been framed. The court should have instructed on 
the basis of the law announced by this court, and this 
is particularly true where appellant in open court ex-
cepted to the instruction. If the instruction was invalid 
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on its face, the verdict of the jury was based upon an 
improper statement of the law, and appellant should not 
he prejudiced when the trial court had an opportunity 
to correct its instruction, and particularly when, as 
pointed out, the error appeared upon the face of the 
ordinance, and extraneous evidence was not necessary 
to establish the invalidity. 
Assignments of error relating to other instructions 
and not argued hy respondent cannot be avoided. A 
general instruction, as pointed out by the authorities 
cited in our original brief, will not cure an erroneous 
mandate contained in another instruction. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court 
invaded the province of the jury in granting a new trial. 
Without any showing whatsoever, the trial court could 
not say that there was "a plain disregard by the jury 
of the instructions * * * or the evidence." The trial 
court could not say without any showing that the ver-
dict was the result of "influence or passion or preju-
dice." The court could not say, contrary to the finding of 
eight jurors, that plaintiff, a father, was entitled to 
substantial damages on account of the death of a mature 
son, who lived months away from home, when plain-
tiff had other sons living with him and contributing 
to his support, and when he himself had a substantial 
income. 
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We submit that this court should not hold that 
the record of misconduct and error in this case was not 
prejudicial. 
We respectfully submit that appellant should he 
granted the relief as prayed. 
Respectfully submitted 
RALPH T. STEW ART 
GERALD IRVINE 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Kenneth Butte. 
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